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The court rejected this argument.
If a class action suit were allowed,
uninsured depositors would race to
the FDIC in order to assert a
preferred claim. The court con-
cluded that this result would make
a "mere mockery" of the equality
promised by the National Bank
Act. Where a fraud affected or
potentially affected all depositors,
all depositors should be treated the
same. Therefore, the court held
that a pro rata distribution of
assets among all of Penn Square's
depositors was the only fair rem-
edy.
Eileen B. Libby
Mandatory Inclusion of
Commercial Leases in a
Cooperative Conversion
of Rent Stabilized
Apartments Did Not
Violate the Sherman Act
Recently, in 305 East 24th Own-
ers Corp. v. Parman Co., 714 F.
Supp. 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the
United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York
held that a seller's including four
long term commercial leases in its
offer to convert rent stabilized
apartments into cooperative units
did not constitute an illegal tying
arrangement in violation of the
Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 7
(1989). In applying the Second
Circuit's five-pronged test to deter-
mine whether an illegal tying ar-
rangement existed, the court ruled
that the tenants failed to show that
the sellers had economic power in
the tying product market or that
the seller's acts had a substantial
anticompetitive effect in the tied
product market. Additionally, the
court concluded that the commer-
cial lease provision of the conver-
sion contract was not unconsciona-
ble because the tenants had mean-
ingful choices in deciding to enter
into the contract and the contract
terms were not unreasonably fa-
vorable to the sellers.
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Background
In August of 1980, Parman Co.
("Parman") submitted to the New
York State Attorney General a
preliminary offering plan to con-
vert the rent stabilized apartments
at 305 East 24th Street to coopera-
tive ownership. Under a coopera-
tive conversion, the tenants pur-
chase stock in and become sole
owners of the corporation that
owns the residence building. The
amount of stock a tenant owns
represents the value of that ten-
ant's residence. Parman's prelimi-
nary offering plan provided that
any tenant who chose not to buy
into the cooperative would have to
vacate the building when it was
converted from an apartment to a
cooperative. In addition, the plan
required that Owners Corp. (the
corporation of tenants which
owned the building under the co-
operative agreement) enter four
long term leases enabling the sell-
ers to retain control of the com-
mercial management services, ga-
rage services, laundry services, and
building management services.
The tenants formed the 305 East
24th Street Tenants' Association
("Tenants' Association" or "Asso-
ciation") and took a number of
actions to improve their position
in negotiating the cooperative con-
version agreement. First, the Ten-
ants' Association retained legal
counsel familiar with cooperative
conversions. Second, eighty per-
cent of the tenants signed No-Buy
Agreements which stated that no
tenant who signed the Agreements
would purchase cooperative shares
until two thirds of the tenants
signed releases from the Agree-
ments. Third, the Association sent
letters to the tenants on a continu-
ing basis to inform them of the
progress in the negotiations. The
letters made particular reference to
the disputed long term leases.
On January 25, 1983, Parman
submitted a formal offering plan to
the New York State Attorney Gen-
eral's Office. The formal plan con-
tained the same commercial lease
agreements. The cover of the plan
included the admonition "See
'Special Risks' Page 1" in bold
print. A portion of the "Special
Risks" section read, "These leases
may not be 'arms-length' transac-
tions and may result in [Owners
Corp.] realizing less than the full
economic value of the garage space
and commercial space." (emphasis
in the original) Unlike the prelimi-
nary plan, however, the formal
plan proposed a non-eviction con-
version. Thus, if a tenant chose not
to buy her shares of the coopera-
tive, she could remain in the build-
ing as a rent stabilized tenant.
On August 12, 1983, the Ten-
ants' Association sent Parman a
letter proposing to reduce the price
per share in the Owners Corp., to
reduce the downpayment required
to purchase shares, and to increase
the rent for the commercial leases.
On April 6, 1984, after negotiating
with the Tenants' Association, Par-
man amended the offering plan to
incorporate a number of the Asso-
ciation's demands: the price per
share in the Owners Corp. was
reduced by 25% for current tenants
buying into the cooperative; the
down payment was reduced from
10% of the purchase price to a flat
sum of one thousand dollars; Par-
man agreed to obtain financing for
those tenants unable to acquire it
otherwise; and Parman agreed to
pay thirty-five thousand dollars of
the Tenants' Association's legal
fees. The commercial leases were
left intact.
Following a Tenants' Associa-
tion question and answer session
regarding the amended plan, the
Association's five-member Execu-
tive Committee recommended
that the tenants sign releases from
the No-Buy Agreements. By Octo-
ber 25, 1984, the date of the clos-
ing, eighty-five percent of the ten-
ants had signed agreements with
Parman to buy shares in Owners
Corp.
Owners Corp. sued Parman in
the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New
York to prevent the conversion.
Owners Corp. argued that the con-
version agreements violated the
Sherman Act antitrust provision
and that the commercial leases
were unconscionable.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Parman argued that the district
court did not have subject matter
(continued on page 52)
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jurisdiction over the Sherman Act
antitrust claim. Previously, the
United States Supreme Court had
established alternative "in com-
merce" and "effect on commerce"
tests for determining a federal
court's jurisdiction over a Sher-
man Act claim. McLain v. Real
Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc.,
444 U.S. 232 (1980). Under these
tests, the plaintiff must show either
that the defendant acted in inter-
state commerce or, if the activity
was local in nature, that the defen-
dant's actions had "an effect on
some other appreciable activity de-
monstrably in interstate com-
merce." Id., at 242.
Applying the "effect on com-
merce" test, the court rejected Par-
man's contention that the sale of
the building together with the
leases was a purely local activity.
The court held that because of New
York City's proximity to New Jer-
sey and Connecticut, potential out-
of-state competitors were effec-
tively precluded from bidding on
the management services provided
for under the leases. Therefore, the
conversion agreement affected in-
terstate commerce and the court
had jurisdiction over the antitrust
claim. In addition, the court noted
that it had diversity jurisdiction
because four of the cooperative
conversion stockholders resided
outside of New York state and
their purchases exceeded three
hundred thousand dollars.
The Tying Claim
Owners Corp. alleged that Par-
man's conditioning the coopera-
tive conversion on including the
commercial leases imposed a tying
arrangement in violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §
1. In a tying arrangement, the sale
of one product (the tying product)
is conditioned on the buyer pur-
chasing a different product (the
tied product).
In order to establish an unlawful
tying arrangement, a plaintiff must
prove five elements: 1) that sepa-
rate tying and tied products ex-
isted; 2) that the seller had suffi-
cient economic power in the tying
product market to coerce the buyer
into accepting the tied product; 3)
that the seller actually coerced the
buyer into accepting the tied prod-
uct; 4) that the sale had anticompe-
titive effects in the tied market;
and 5) that the sale had a substan-
tial effect on interstate commerce.
Applying this test, the court held
that Owners Corp. had established
that separate products existed, that
Parman coerced the buyers, and
that the sale involved a substantial
amount of interstate commerce in
the tied product market. However,
the court concluded that Owners
Corp. failed to show that Parman
had sufficient economic power in
the cooperative conversion market
or that the sale had anticompeti-
tive effects in the tied product
market.
Separate Tying and Tied Prod-
ucts. The court agreed with Owners
Corp. that the building and the
commercial leases represented two
distinct products. In determining
that two separate products existed,
the court considered whether con-
sumers would commonly seek to
purchase the tying product (the
building) separate from the tied
product (the commercial leases).
Parman argued that the sale of the
cooperative units with the com-
mercial leases represented one in-
tegrated product. The court disa-
greed and held that there was a
demand for cooperative apart-
ments separate from a demand for
commercial, garage, laundry, and
building management services. In
fact, Parman had converted six
other buildings into cooperative
apartments exclusive of such
leases.
Coercion. Next, Owners Corp.
argued that Parman coerced it into
accepting the leases as part of the
conversion. The court agreed for
two reasons. First, although the
tenants willingly subscribed to the
plan, the leases were clearly detri-
mental to the tenants' interests.
Second, the court believed the tes-
timony provided by Owners Corp.
that Parman refused to sell unless
the leases were included. The Ten-
ants' Association objected to the
leases throughout the negotiations
and the tenants ultimately agreed
to the leases because they thought
it necessary to achieve the conver-
sion.
Effect on Interstate Commerce.
The court also held that the sale
had a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce. In determining
whether the effect of the sale was
substantial, the court focused on
the dollar amount involved rather
than the percentage of the tied
product market which was fore-
closed by the arrangement. The
commercial leases encompassed
$300,000 a year in management
services over a forty year period.
The court held that the dollar
amount constituted a substantial
amount of interstate commerce in
the tied product market.
Economic Power in the Tying
Product Market. To establish that
the seller had economic power, a
plaintiff must show that the seller
controlled a large share of the
market in the tying product, or that
the seller had some advantage not
shared by its competitors. Owners
Corp. argued that Parman had an
advantage over its competitors be-
cause 305 East 24th, being the
tenants' home, was unique. There-
fore, Parman had the economic
power to raise prices and compel
the tenants to accept "burden-
some" terms. The court rejected
the argument because the tenants
had not shown that the building
was irreplaceable or dissimilar to
others on the market. Moreover,
nearly half of the tenants assigned
their purchase rights to someone
else or sold their unit within three
years of the conversion.
Alternatively, Owners Corp.
argued that the building was
unique because it represented a
once in a life time opportunity to
purchase an apartment for an "in-
sider" (discounted) price. The
court stated that to construe this as
bestowing economic power on the
seller would "turn anti-trust law on
its head." 714 F. Supp. at 1307.
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The court noted that Parman could
not offer a cooperative unit to an
outsider unless a tenant refused to
purchase her shares and did not
stay in the building as a rent
stabilized tenant. Because the ten-
ants could remain without buying
into the cooperative, Parman had
to offer the cooperative units at
substantially less than their market
value. Therefore, the court held
that Parman did not have substan-
tial economic power in the tying
product market.
Anticompetitive Effects in the
Tied Market. Owners Corp. of-
fered testimony that the coopera-
tive agreement precluded other
businesses from bidding on the
services provided under the com-
mercial leases. The court stated,
however, that the agreement must
affect an "appreciable" number of
buyers in the tied market, thus
foreclosing a substantial volume of
commerce from competition. In
this case, the leases pertained to
commercial, garage, laundry and
management services in only one
building. The court held that any
effect the sale had on the vast
market for these services was min-
uscule. Additionally, the court rec-
ognized that before the coopera-
tive conversion Parman owned the
building and provided the manage-
ment services, thereby precluding
other vendors of management
services. After the conversion, Par-
man continued to provide these
services and, therefore, the agree-
ment did not diminish competition
in the tied market. Therefore, the
court rejected Owners Corp.'s
Sherman Act antitrust claim.
Unconscionability Claim
The court next considered
whether including the commercial
leases in the conversion plain was
unconscionable. In order to estab-
lish an unconscionability claim
under New York law, the plaintiff
must establish two glements: first,
that one of the parties lacked any
meaningful choice; and second,
that the contract terms were unrea-
sonably favorable to the other
party. Addressing the first prong of
the unconscionability test, the
court concluded that the tenants
exercised a meaningful choice be-
cause they formed a tenants asso-
ciation, were represented by legal
counsel, engaged in negotiations
over several months and entered
into the cooperative agreements
aware of the disadvantageous
leases. Also, because the plan was a
non-eviction conversion, the ten-
ants were not compelled to pur-
chase their units but could have
remained in the building indefi-
nitely as rent stabilized tenants.
Moreover, because the tenants pur-
chased their units significantly
below market value, the court did
not consider them victims of an
unconscionable contract.
Regarding the second prong of
the unconscionability test, the
court concluded that the commer-
cial leases were not unreasonably
favorable to Parman when consid-
ered in light of the agreement as a
whole. When there was an eviction
clause in the plan, the tenants
signed the No-Buy Agreements.
However, after the eviction clause
was removed, the tenants res-
cinded their No-Buy Agreements.
The court reasoned that if the
tenants believed the commercial
leases were so disadvantageous as
to make the entire plan inequita-
ble, the tenants would not have
rescinded their No-Buy Agree-
ments. Therefore, the court also
rejected Owners Corp.'s uncons-
cionability claim.
Tayebe G. Shah-Mirany
Eliminating Abusive
Collection Practices by
Third Parties Under the
Federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act
Recently, the Supreme Court of
Wyoming ruled on the applicabil-
ity of the federal Fair Debt Collec-
tion Practices Act ("FDCPA" or
"Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 to 1692o
(1989), to a Wyoming collection
agency collecting a check upon
which the drawer had stopped pay-
ment. In Johnson v. Statewide Col-
lections, Inc., 778 P.2d 93 (Wyo.
1989), the court held that the col-
lection agency violated the
FDCPA by failing to properly ver-
ify the alleged debt after the con-
sumer indicated that he disputed
the debt, by asserting an amount
due that the agency was not enti-
tled to recover, and by contacting
the debtor when the agency was, or
should have been, aware that the
debtor was represented by an attor-
ney. The court also held, however,
that the collection agency did not
violate the FDCPA by using its
"doing business as" name in its
letters to the debtor, or by failing to
advise the debtor that it had re-
turned the dishonored check to the
retail store.
Background
On November 11, 1986, Freddie
Johnson ("Johnson") purchased a
shotgun from a retail store for
$129.99 and paid for it by check.
Johnson later discovered that the
shotgun was defective. He returned
the shotgun to the store and re-
quested a refund. The store em-
ployee accepted the shotgun but
refused to return Johnson's check.
Johnson contacted his bank and
stopped payment on the check.
When Johnson's bank returned the
check to the store, the store sent the
check to Statewide Collectionrs,
Inc. (doing business as "Check-
Rite") for collection.
Johnson attempted to resolve
the matter by contacting the store,
but the store referred him to
CheckRite. When Johnson con-
tacted CheckRite, he was referred
back to the store and told that he
must contact the store with any
problems he had with the merchan-
dise or his check.
On November 21, CheckRite
sent a "Return Check Notice" to
Johnson demanding that he pay
$144.99 directly to CheckRite. The
amount demanded included a $15
"service charge" in addition to the
merchandise price. Johnson imme-
diately contacted his attorney who
wrote a letter to the store stating
that Johnson disputed the alleged
debt. A copy of the attorney's letter
was sent to CheckRite.
After receiving the letter from
Johnson's attorney, CheckRite
sent a second notice directly to
Johnson. This notice demanded
(continued on page 54)
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